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This study focuses on the effects of decentralized wage schemes and temporary
forms of employment on ﬁrm performance. The effect of monetary incentives on
workers’ effort and ﬁrm performance is a central topic in economics. According
to the principal-agent paradigm, ﬁrms (the principal) have to link employees’
remuneration schemes to any veriﬁable indicator of performance to avoid oppor-
tunistic behavior. The empirical evidence shows that ﬁnancial incentives have the
potential to exert strong effects on indicators of ﬁrm performance, such as produc-
tivity and worker absenteeism, although the degree of effectiveness of such
schemes varies signiﬁcantly according to the institutional/economic context in
which ﬁrms operate. From both a theoretical and empirical point of view, the pre-
diction on the effects of temporary types of employment on effort and productiv-
ity is less neat. In light of these considerations, this study uses a sample of Italian
ﬁrms to provide further empirical evidence on whether and to what extent perfor-
mance-related pay schemes and contract ﬂexibility affect workers’ effort (in terms
of absenteeism) and, in turn, ﬁrm productivity. These effects are analyzed for dif-
ferent types of workers (white collar vs. blue collar), working in workplaces char-
acterized by a different degree of uncertainty and risk and in ﬁrms operating in
different economic and institutional settings. Our results show that wage ﬂexi-
bility has a signiﬁcant effect on effort and then on ﬁrm’s productivity and that
white-collar workers are more responsive to monetary incentives than blue-collar
workers. Moreover, the presence of a large share of temporary contracts, implying
a lower dismissal probability for permanent workers and a deterioration of the
working environment, appears to reduce workers’ motivation and effort.
Introduction
THE LAST TWO DECADES HAVE WITNESSED A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE LABOR
MARKET ﬂexibility in all European countries. Rigidities in the labor market are
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considered by the most debated strand of macroeconomic literature among the
key causes of the poor performance of the labor market both in terms of par-
ticipation and employment (among others Blanchard and Wolfers 2000;
Burgess, Lane, and Stevens 2000; Siebert 1997). In this study, we are inter-
ested in an empirical assessment of the effects of ﬂexibility on ﬁrm productiv-
ity through workers’ performance, which depends on a number of components
such as effort (one of its dimensions being absenteeism), worker cooperation,
and so on. In particular, we will focus on two forms of ﬂexibility commonly
identiﬁed by the literature: external (numerical) ﬂexibility and wage (ﬁnancial)
ﬂexibility.1 The former is related to the capacity of the ﬁrm to adjust its work-
force to changes in the economic conditions and depends on the strictness of
employment protection legislation and the availability of temporary forms of
employment, while the latter concerns the responsiveness of wages to external
shocks and changes in internal productivity and largely depends on the fea-
tures of the wage setting institutions.
Temporary employment has grown in a number of OECD countries during
the past two decades raising concerns that temporary jobs may be crowding
out more stable forms of employment, becoming an additional source of inse-
curity for workers. From a theoretical and empirical point of view, the effects
of temporary forms of employment on productivity are ambiguous and depend
mainly on the reasons why employers use them. For instance, Boeri and
Garibaldi (2007) ﬁnd a positive temporary effect on employment and a perma-
nent negative effect on productivity, while other authors (see for example Ichi-
no and Riphahn 2005) ﬁnd a positive impact when temporary jobs have a high
probability to be transformed into permanent ones after the probation period.
Generally speaking, the use of temporary workers as buffer stocks increases
job instability and uncertainty inside the ﬁrm, reduces investment in training,
lowers workplace cooperation and workers’ motivations, and harms long-run
growth prospects (Blanchard and Landier 2002). On the contrary, temporary
contracts used as screening devices generate better growth prospects due to
better learning about the quality of the match and lower incentive to shirking
for temporary workers. This may translate into better job matches and, there-
fore, more stable employer–employee relationships in the long run (Portugal
and Varejao 2009).
Considering the second dimension of ﬂexibility, there is a large theoretical
and empirical literature on the effects of wage incentive schemes on effort and
productivity. The efﬁciency wage theory in the eliciting effort version (Shapiro
and Stiglitz 1984; Solow 1979) shows that ﬁrms pay higher salary to motivate
1 For a detailed classiﬁcation of labor market ﬂexibility see Beatson (1995).
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workers to work harder. A similar reason, else if in a dynamic setting inside
the careers’ proﬁles is the basis to design right schemes of incentives under
tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981). It means that in the face of asymmetric
information, ﬁrms should tie the remuneration of employees to any veriﬁable
(individual or collective) signal of performance. Based on such a theoretical
prediction, a number of studies in recent years have shown that, when imple-
mented wisely, ﬁnancial incentives have the potential to exert strong effects on
indicators of ﬁrm performance, such as productivity (Damiani and Ricci 2008;
Fuss 2009; Gielen, Kerkhofs, and Ours 2010; Lazear 2000), labor demand for
ﬂexible workers (Benito and Hernando 2008), and workers’ effort (Brown,
Fakhfakh, and Sessions 1999; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1989; Wilson and Peel
1991). By exploiting another dimension of wage ﬂexibility Guiso, Pistaferri,
and Schivardi (2005) ﬁnd that sensitivity of workers’ wages to permanent
shocks is negatively correlated with the workers’ risk aversion and the overall
variability of ﬁrm performance.
In Italy, the period of labor market reforms aimed at reducing worker pro-
tection and increasing decentralized wage determination started at the begin-
ning of the 1990s with the tripartite agreements of 1993 (signed by the
national trade unions, government, and industrial associations), which marked
the end of the automatic wage indexation system (the so-called scala mobile).2
Moreover, the 1993 agreement introduced a two stage bargaining system
consisting of national-level bargaining (by economic sector) and local-level
agreements. The main objective of the national/sector-level bargaining was to
maintain the purchasing power of wages and to determine the basic wage
guarantees (minimi tabellari), which represent a ﬂoor to wage adjustments.
Local bargaining (either at the regional or ﬁrm level) had to allow possible
rent sharing through performance-related pay schemes rather than ﬁxed (usu-
ally irreversible) premiums. Institutional reforms aimed at deregulating the
Italian labor market through the introduction of various forms of temporary
and atypical contracts have been gradually introduced since the mid-1990s.
The two principal reforms in this direction have been the Treu reform in 1997
and Biagi reform in 2003,3 which (de)regulated and extended the adoption of
ﬁxed-term contracts, allowed the use of temporary agency workers, and intro-
duced new “atypical” contractual arrangements.
To assess how and in what direction reforms have impacted the Italian
regulatory framework and how Italy ranks in comparison with other industrialized
2 In light of the inverted u-shape relationship found in Calmfors and Drifﬁll (1988) and Tarantelli
(1986) this means a shift on the left tail of the curve.
3 Elia (2010) used the 2003 reform as an instrument to test how the wage gap for permanent–temporary
workers changed after that break, ﬁnding a positive effect on this gap stronger for skilled workers.
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countries, we can look at a standard de jure labor market ﬂexibility indicator, the
Employment Protection Index (EPL) constructed by the OECD. According to
the EPL indicators, in 2008 Italy ranks broadly mid-ﬁeld in OECD comparison
(twenty-ﬁfth out of forty countries) with the EPL indicators being 1.89 against
an OECD average of 1.94. In 1990, Italy ranked fourth out of twenty-six coun-
tries in the same decreasing order of protection. We should stress that, in Italy, as
in many other European countries in the 1990s, the increase in ﬂexibility was
mainly obtained through the liberalization of the use of temporary forms of
employment while leaving unchanged the protection of permanent incumbent
workers. Concerning wage ﬂexibility, Clar, Dreger, and Rams (2007) rank Italy
twelfth out of eighteen OECD countries in a meta-analysis, thus conﬁrming the
previous results obtained by Heylen (1993). This seems to indicate that these
reforms have changed numerical ﬂexibility much more than wage ﬂexibility.
Using a sample of Italian ﬁrms, the aim of this study is to empirically assess
whether and to what extent decentralized wage schemes on one hand and tem-
porary forms of employment on the other, affect worker absenteeism and more
generally ﬁrms’ productivity. We want also to disentangle the speciﬁc contri-
bution of wage and employment ﬂexibility to ﬁrm productivity. Finally, we
use white and blue collar workers as different labor inputs in the production
function to see whether they are affected differently by ﬂexibility practices.
The remainder of the work is structured it follows. In the next section, we
explain our empirical strategy and brieﬂy describe the methodology we use.
Next, we describe the data sets we use and the characteristics of the sample.
In the Results section, we present and discuss the results of the empirical anal-
ysis, followed by conclusive considerations.
Empirical Strategy and Measurement Issues
To assess the impact of wage and numerical ﬂexibility on productivity, our
empirical model takes into account the simultaneous interactions between
workers’ effort and ﬁrms’ performance on the one hand and workers’ effort
and its determinants on the other. One important issue is how to deﬁne and
measure workers’ effort. Despite there is consensus on the fact that the com-
mitment and effectiveness with which workers fulﬁll their assigned tasks mat-
ters for labor productivity, neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature
provide a unique, widely accepted deﬁnition of this concept.
The empirical literature has operationalized the idea of effort in a number of
different ways, which may be classiﬁed in two broad categories. The ﬁrst cate-
gory includes studies which use observable and “objective” indicators of effort
(or negative effort) such as absenteeism (Arai and Thoursie 2005; Barmby,
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Orme, and Treble 1991; Bradley, Green, and Leeves 2007; Engellandt and
Riphahn 2005; Ichino and Riphahn 2005; Winckelmann 1999) or disciplinary
dismissals (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991). Other studies, which are based on
information collected from surveys of employees consider self-reported
(subjective) measures of effort/motivation as indicators of individual commit-
ment to work.
Our approach is twofold. First, we use an observable component of effort
(negative absenteeism) and estimate a model in which workers’ absenteeism
and ﬁrm productivity are both observable and endogenous. Absenteeism can
be considered a measure of workers’ shirking for a number of reasons. Given
asymmetric information on workers’ health conditions, workers may try to
reduce the amount of work by deciding to report sick even when they are
not.4 Moreover, since in Italy absence due to illness cannot be compensated
with extra hours above the working hours, which are set by collective agree-
ments, and employees are fully insured against earning losses due to illness,
absenteeism may be considered a good empirical proxy for employees’ shirk-
ing behavior. Although effort has additional dimensions other than absentee-
ism, such as workers’ cooperation and work intensity, the latter, though
correlated with absenteeism, are generally not observable.
Secondly, as absenteeism captures one dimension of effort, we carry out
additional checks to assess the (direct) effects of our numerical and wage ﬂexi-
bility on ﬁrms’ performance. Following Black and Lynch’s (2001) two-step
procedure, we estimate a ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component from the
residuals of a production function over the longest time span for which
we have data availability. We then regress this component on the ﬂexibility
indicators. This ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component of the production func-
tion is something broader than effort as it may be identiﬁed as an indicator for
technical efﬁciency, which includes effort as well as other characteristics such
as managerial quality, human capital training, cooperation between workers,
informational issues, and others. This second speciﬁcation allows us to assess
whether and to what extent ﬂexibility may have an impact on ﬁrm productivity
not only through absenteeism but also through other unobservable components
of technical efﬁciency. We further check the robustness of our results using
the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique, which allows us to capture
the relationship between the unobserved (latent) variable effort and ﬁrms’
productivity.
4 Among others, see Brown and Sessions (1996) for a review of the literature and Markussen et al.
(2011) for extensive evidence on the relevance of moral hazard issues in determining sickness absence
levels.
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The basic model. The basic framework is a standard Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function for a representative ﬁrm with only two inputs: effective labor
(E) and capital (K)
Yi ¼ AiKai Ebi expui ð1Þ
Ei ¼ eiL^i ð2Þ
ei ¼ f ðZiÞ; ð3Þ
where E is a broad concept of the labor factor including effort (equation 2). In
particular, ei is the average effort of the labor force in ﬁrm i and L^i is the
number of workers employed expressed in terms of full-time equivalent units
and adjusted for quality (human capital), type of contracts (temporary vs.
permanent), and qualiﬁcation of employees (blue collar vs. white collar).
In turn, the average amount of effort in ﬁrm i is inﬂuenced by a number of
variables in the vector Zi, which contains:
1. Wage structure indicators, which include a performance-related
pay element (as a share of total remuneration),5 other production
premia and bonuses, super minimum differentials, and seniority
differentials.6
2. Numerical (external) ﬂexibility indicators, which include the share
of temporary contracts (ﬁxed-term contracts, traineeship contracts,
and other “atypical” contracts7), conversion rates (from temporary
to permanent jobs), turnover rate, hiring policies (temporary vs.
permanent), and displacement risk. We also include an indicator of
the degree of employment protection related to ﬁrm dimension and
a dummy for the strictness of employment protection legislation,
which assumes value 1 for ﬁrms with more than ﬁfteen employees
and zero otherwise.8
5 This component of the wage is based on previous year performance results. The performance results
are decided without formal negotiations with the trade unions and not on permanent basis.
6 Super minimum are company-level wage increments added to the contractual minimum on a permanent
basis with either a ﬁrm-level or a worker-level component. Super minimum and seniority differentials are
relative to ﬁrms operating in the same sector of activity.
7 Atypical contracts include external collaborations and agency contracts.
8 According to the Art. 18 of the “Statuto dei Lavoratori” (Law 300), ﬁrms with more than ﬁfteen
employees had to reinstate workers and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals. On the other
hand, ﬁrms with fewer than sixteen employees have to pay severance payments without any reinstatement.
This means that the cost of unfair dismissals for ﬁrms with fewer than ﬁfteen employees is lower relative to
the cost for ﬁrms with more than ﬁfteen employees.
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3. Workers’ outside opportunities such as the local unemployment
rate (that is a measure of the degree of the economic activity in
the local labor market) and indicators of the characteristics of the
local production area (whether the ﬁrm is located in an industrial
district or in a metropolitan area).
4. Labor force and ﬁrm characteristics such as human capital endow-
ment and gender composition, ﬁrm size, workers’ contractual
arrangements, and workers’ qualiﬁcation (white collar and blue
collar).
Effort ei is proxied by an indicator of (negative) absenteeism, which is mea-
sured at ﬁrm level as the ratio between the actual worked hours and the total
contractual working hours.9
We allow labor input heterogeneity by differentiating workers by multiple
characteristics. We distinguish between temporary and permanent workers,
skilled and unskilled workers, and white and blue collar workers.
The empirical speciﬁcation is the following:10
ln Yi ¼ a lnKi þ b lnðeLÞi þ uT
LT
L
 
i
þuH
LH
L
 
i
þuW
LW
L
 
i
þui ð4Þ
ln ei ¼ c0Zi þ ei: ð5Þ
In equation (4), φT /b represents the productivity premium of a temporary
worker relative to a permanent worker, φH/b represents the productivity pre-
mium of a high-schooled worker relative to a low-schooled worker, and φW/b
represents the productivity premium of a white-collar relative to a blue-collar
worker (Konings and Vanormelingen 2010). Unfortunately, we do not observe
the number of high-schooled and low-schooled workers, nor the number of
temporary and permanent workers for each employee type. This forces us to
make some simplifying assumptions similar to other studies that divide the
labor force across several dimensions (Konings and Vanormelingen 2010; Van
Biesebroeck 2007). First, we assume that the relative differences in marginal
productivity between two workers that differ by one characteristic are the
same, irrespective of their other characteristics. Second, we restrict the propor-
tion of one type of worker to be constant across other groups deﬁned by the
other characteristics.
9 The average hours of absence at ﬁrm level are calculated as the hours lost due to sickness (3.5 percent
of working time), and other paid absences, which include medical visits, union activity, and parental leaves
apart from compulsory maternity (1.5 percent of working time).
10 See Appendix 1 in Konings and Vanormelingen (2010) for a formal derivation of the empirical speci-
ﬁcation of equation (1) where workers can be differentiated by multiple characteristics.
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The model with heterogeneous workers. We relax the assumption that
blue-collar and white-collar workers are perfect substitutes. Similarly to equa-
tion 1, we divide the workforce by their human capital characteristics and type
of contract and allow blue-collar and white-collar workers to be imperfectly
substitutable in the production process. We then include effective labor for
blue-collar and white-collar workers separately in the production function,
obtaining the following speciﬁcation:11
Yi ¼ AiKai EbWW ;iEbBB;i expui ð6Þ
EW ;i ¼ eW ;iL^W ;i ð7Þ
EB;i ¼ eB;iL^B;i ð8Þ
eW ;i ¼ f ðZW ;iÞ ð9Þ
eB;i ¼ f ðZB;iÞ; ð10Þ
where eB,i and eW,i are the average levels of effort of blue-collar and white-
collar workers, respectively, in ﬁrm i. As before, the average effort is
inﬂuenced by a number of variables in the vectors ZBi and ZWi, which may be
speciﬁc to workers’ qualiﬁcation.
The corresponding empirical speciﬁcation for the system of equations is the
following:
ln Yi ¼ a lnKi þ bW lnðeWLWÞi þ bB lnðeBLBÞi þ /T
LT
L
 
i
þ/H
LH
L
 
i
þu
ð11Þ
ln eWi ¼ c0WZWi þ eWi ð12Þ
ln eBi ¼ c0ZBi þ eBi; ð13Þ
where the effort equations for white-collar and blue-collar workers are esti-
mated separately.
These two systems of equations are estimated through a three-stage least-
squares technique, given the simultaneity of the work variables in the produc-
tion and in the effort functions.
11 Although we could also observe the number of managers in a ﬁrm, including them separately in the
production function would have implied to exclude too many observations because only a small percentage
of ﬁrms report a positive number of managers. We count the number of managers as white-collar workers
instead.
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Data Description
The empirical analysis is based on ﬁrm-level data sourced from the annual
labor market survey carried out by the Italian Manufacturing and Service
Industries Association (Conﬁndustria). The aim of the survey is to collect
information on the state of employment in the Italian productive sectors (with
a focus on industry sectors), with particular reference to the structural eco-
nomic–normative aspects normally overlooked by ofﬁcial surveys. On average
around 4400 ﬁrms employing more than 732,000 workers are surveyed every
year. The Conﬁndustria labor market survey is administered at establishment/
ﬁrm level by the territorial associations of Conﬁndustria, which are in charge
of the distribution and collection of the questionnaires to/from their afﬁliated
ﬁrms. The entire database is then processed at a centralized level where the
data are subject to extensive quality checks.
The Conﬁndustria survey is a unique source of information on ﬁrms’ wage
strategy (wage structure for different type of workers) and numerical ﬂexibility
practices (both in terms of stocks and ﬂows). Moreover, it provides detailed
information on the human capital characteristics of the workforce employed in
the ﬁrms and working time.
The questionnaire consists of three main sections. The ﬁrst section asks
questions on the employment composition of the ﬁrm (by sex, type of contract,
education and qualiﬁcation) and job ﬂows (hires by type of contract, number
of ﬁxed-term contracts converted to permanent, separation by reason). The
second part of the questionnaire asks questions on working time (including
overtime and hours of absence by reason) by qualiﬁcation (manager, white-collar
and blue-collar workers). Finally, the third part of the questionnaire contains
detailed information on the wage structure by qualiﬁcation, including the vari-
able pay component disentangled in performance premia (generally based on
ﬁrm performance) and other individual premia and bonuses (generally related
to individual and team performance).
Although the survey is conducted annually, the information on the wage
structure and absenteeism (our key variables of interest) is only available for
the years 2008 and 2009. Thus, the ﬁnal sample consists of 2098 ﬁrms12 over
the years 2008 and 2009, with 2009 accounting for the 75 percent of the
observations. Although the survey has not been created with a longitudinal
design, 17 percent of the ﬁrms are surveyed in both years.13
12 We exclude from the original sample ﬁrms for which detailed information on hours of absence and
on wage bill components is not available.
13 We take into account this features of the sample in several ways in the estimation.
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We match the data from the Conﬁndustria survey with balance sheets data
provided by the AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) data-
base14 and with information on the conditions and characteristics of local labor
markets15 provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Tables 1 and 2 show some descriptive statistics and the sample coverage for
the main set of variables we employ in our empirical analysis.
In Table 1, we compare our data with the administrative database on Italian
ﬁrms and business (ASIA) collected by the Italian National Institute of Statis-
tics. The table shows that, once we exclude microﬁrms from the comparison,
small-medium ﬁrms are well represented with a coverage of 72 percent of the
sample, although large ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector remain slightly over-
represented.16 The same comparison shows a good territorial coverage of our
data, with the ﬁrms located in the Center-South accounting for around 21 per-
cent of the sample (30 percent in the ISTAT database).17
Table 2 shows the breakdown of the wage bill into its various components.
The industry-wide component accounts for 81 percent of the wage bill, which
means that about 20 percent of wage is determined at ﬁrm level (column 5 in
Table 2). Half of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component is the result of local bargaining
(super minimum) and the rest is a variable premium (generally based on
ﬁrms’ performance) and other bonuses (set at individual basis). These ﬁgures
show that there is signiﬁcant scope for ﬁrms to determine the remunerations
of their employees above the level set at industry-level bargaining.
14 The AIDA database provides information on ﬁrm value added and ﬁxed asset for 2008 and 2009.
Moreover, we use data from AIDA (value added, ﬁxed asset, and number of employees) for a longer period
of time (from 2000 to 2009) in the estimation of the production function in the ﬁrst step of the Black and
Lynch (2001) procedure.
15 Italy’s Local Labour Systems (Sistemi Locali del Lavoro) are deﬁned as self-contained labor markets
with respect to daily commuting trips. The Italian territory is partitioned into 686 local labor systems using
the Population Census of 2001. The ISTAT (Istituto nazionale di statistica; Italian Statistical Institute) data-
base on Local Labour Systems (SLLs) provides information on the unemployment rate in each SLL and the
characteristics of productive areas (namely the presence of an industrial districts and/or of a metropolitan
area).
16 According to ASIA (2008), in Italy microﬁrms (with fewer than ﬁfteen employees) account for almost
95 percent of the productive sectors. Nevertheless, they employ less then 50 percent of the total workforce,
while workers employed in large ﬁrms (larger than 250 employees) represent more than 20 percent of the
total workforce.
17 Our sample characteristics and coverage is in line with that employed in Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schi-
vardi (2005) in a related analysis, constructed using data from administrative sources (INPS [Istituto Nazio-
nale della Previdenza Sociale; Social Security Italian Institute] and Centrale dei Bilanci). Although the two
databases are obtained from two different data sources, they are rather similar in terms of the average num-
ber of employees, industry, and geographical coverage. Moreover, the two databases are similar in terms of
labor force characteristics (women share, white- and blue-collar shares) and wage structure.
746 / MICHELE BATTISTI AND GIOVANNA VALLANTI
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Conﬁndustria database
(2008–2009) Mean SD
Italian ﬁrms (ISTAT-ASIA 2008)
Industry and employees>15
(75 percent of our sample)
(a) Firm characteristics
Value added 14.12 53.17
Capital stock 42.71 28.49
Number of employees 195 1032
North 0.79 0.41 0.67
Center 0.14 0.35 0.17
South 0.07 0.26 0.15
Industry 0.91 0.28
Services 0.09 0.28
Small (<50) 0.55 0.50 0.67
Medium (50–250) 0.17 0.38 0.29
Large (>250) 0.28 0.45 0.04
(b) Labor force characteristics
Share women 0.25 0.19
Share white-collar workers 0.38 0.20
Share temporary workers 0.09 0.08
Share high-skilled workers 0.07 0.10
Share part time 0.06 0.05
(c) Absenteeism
Average worker 0.051 0.032
White collar 0.042 0.021
Blue collar 0.071 0.044
North 0.051 0.031
Center 0.051 0.030
South 0.052 0.034
Industry 0.052 0.030
Services 0.044 0.029
Small (<50) 0.043 0.031
Medium (50–250) 0.056 0.026
Large (>250) 0.064 0.025
(d) Labor market characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.042 0.018
North 0.038 0.007
Center 0.053 0.015
South 0.114 0.028
Industrial district 0.362 0.481
North 0.362 0.481
Center 0.480 0.501
South 0.060 0.238
Metropolitan area 0.327 0.469
North 0.351 0.478
Center 0.152 0.360
South 0.214 0.413
NOTE: Value added and capital stocks are in millions of euro. Absenteeism at ﬁrm level is the average amount of hours of
absence as a percentage of contractual working hours. Data on value added and capital stock are drawn from the AIDA
database; absenteeism and workforce composition are calculated using information from Conﬁndustria database. Data on
the local rate of unemployment and productive characteristics are obtained from the SLLs database (ISTAT).
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Results
Three-stage least-squares pooled estimation results. The three-stage least-
squares (3SLS) approach allows estimating the production function equation
(equation 4) and the effort equation (equation 5) simultaneously, treating
both ﬁrm productivity and absenteeism as endogenous. Tables 3 and 418
show the results. In each table, column (1) reports the unweighted estimates,
while in column (2) the observations belonging to the two surveys (2008
and 2009) are weighted differently, so that the results are not driven by the
2009 data. Speciﬁcally, the weights are the inverse of the number of obser-
vations by year, so that both years have the same impact on the ﬁnal
results.
The Cobb–Douglas production function ﬁts well the data and the estimated
coefﬁcients have the expected sign. The fact that the coefﬁcient of labor is
higher than the textbook expectation is usually explained in the growth
accounting tradition by the fact that we should consider also human capital
together with the physical capital stock19 and is in line with previous empirical
works at ﬁrm level (Konings and Vanormelingen 2010). Moreover, our speciﬁ-
cation of labor as effort augmented is not rejected by the data so that the labor
TABLE 2
WAGE BILL STRUCTURE
Annual
wage
Industry
share Super-minimum
Production
bonus
Variable
premium
Firm share
(cols. 3+4+5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average worker 29024 0.812 0.129 0.023 0.036 0.188
White collar 34855 0.747 0.197 0.023 0.033 0.253
Blue collar 25379 0.856 0.086 0.021 0.037 0.144
Manufacturing 28984 0.808 0.131 0.026 0.035 0.192
Services 29449 0.826 0.118 0.016 0.040 0.174
Small ﬁrm 27759 0.810 0.132 0.023 0.034 0.190
Medium ﬁrm 29323 0.811 0.132 0.025 0.033 0.189
Large ﬁrm 31299 0.807 0.118 0.035 0.039 0.193
NOTE: Annual wage is in euros. Information on wage bill structure is from the Conﬁndustria labor market survey.
18 We use progressive sub numerations for tables belonging to same estimation; that is, 1.1, 1.2, and
progressive numeration for tables reporting results belonging to different estimations, that is 1, 2, 3. All
regressions include year, macroregion, and industry dummies. Firms are classiﬁed according to the industry
classiﬁcation identiﬁed by the national collective agreement (Contratto Collettivo Nazionale del Lavoro
[CCNL]) applied in the company. We deﬁne ten productive sectors: food and beverages; textiles; footwear
and leather products; rubber and plastic products; chemical and pharmaceutical products; metalworking;
other manufacturing sectors; construction; trade, transport and telecommunication; other service.
19 See for instance Caselli 2005.
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input measured as number of workers in full-time equivalent units, and the
effort indicator has the same coefﬁcients.20
More qualiﬁed workers (white collar) are more productive than blue collar
with a productive premium of being white collar of about 20 percent. The
presence of a higher share of graduates has a positive effect although not
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Temporary forms of employment do not
appear to have a signiﬁcant direct effect on productivity. We also include
interactions among the different types of human capital (the share of white-col-
lar, temporary, and graduate workers) to capture the presence of complementa-
rities among them, that is, the productivity gains of graduate workers is
affected by the composition of the labor force inside the ﬁrm in terms of type
of occupation (white collar versus blue collar) and/or in terms of the type of
contract. The coefﬁcients of the interactions terms are all negative and not sig-
niﬁcant at conventional levels.
The coefﬁcients of the effort equation are presented in Table 4. Wage ﬂexi-
bility appears to have a negative impact on the average level of effort inside
the ﬁrm, although the coefﬁcient is only marginally signiﬁcant and becomes
TABLE 3
PRODUCTION FUNCTION WITH ONE TYPE OF WORKER: 3SLS RESULTS
Dependent variable: value added Pooled estimation (1) Pooled weighted (2)
Labor input (E = eL) 0.606 (0.049)*** 0.676 (0.037)***
Physical capital stock 0.186 (0.025)*** 0.204 (0.021)***
Share temporary workers 0.354 (0.490) 0.386 (0.452)
Share white-collar workers 0.837 (0.177)*** 0.814 (0.111)***
Share graduate workers 1.022 (1.107) 0.598 (0.720)
Share temporary 9 Share graduate 4.443 (3.366) 2.841 (1.925)
Share temporary 9 Share white 0.810 (1.573) 0.885 (1.138)
Share white 9 Share graduate 1.024 (0.898) 0.586 (0.885)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 2098 2098
Number of ﬁrms 1920 1920
R2 0.58 0.70
p-value l = e 0.46 0.25
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Clusterized robust standard errors (264 clusters) appear in
parentheses. Labor input and capital stock are instrumented with their lagged values.
Estimation of equation (4).
20 The restriction on equality of the coefﬁcients of labor (L) and effort (e) is tested through an F-test
and then imposed in the model. We also test the presence of the constant return to scales (CRS) hypothesis,
which is rejected by the data.
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not signiﬁcant in the sample-weighted regression. Also, the other monetary
forms of incentivation do not have a signiﬁcant impact on effort.
Considering the effect of numerical ﬂexibility on permanent workers’ effort,
we can see that the level of absenteeism increases with the share of temporary
workers employed by the ﬁrms both if we consider the ﬂow (temporary
hirings) and the change in the stock. Moreover, such effect appears to be
quantitatively and qualitatively the same whatever type of temporary contract
TABLE 4
EFFORT EQUATION WITH ONE TYPE OF WORKER: 3SLS RESULTS
Dependent variable: workers’ effort
Pooled estimation
(1)
Pooled weighted
(2)
Wage ﬂexibility
Share variable wage premium 0.056 (0.031)* 0.046 (0.031)
Share other wage premium 0.007 (0.023) 0.022 (0.024)
Super minimum differential 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
Seniority differential 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Numerical ﬂexibility
Risk of dismissals 0.028 (0.015)* 0.035 (0.016)**
Hiring rate 0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Share of temporary hiring 0.005 (0.002)** 0.008 (0.003)***
Share of temporary workers 0.038 (0.014)*** 0.068 (0.016)***
Share of temporary workers*trans. 0.109 (0.042)*** 0.208 (0.047)***
Share of apprenticeship 0.007 (0.015) 0.013 (0.017)
Share of collaborators 0.009 (0.009) 0.010 (0.010)
Share of part-time workers 0.002 (0.012) 0.023 (0.012)*
Share of agency workers 0.0001 (0.000)** 0.0001 (0.000)**
Labor and ﬁrm characteristics
Presence of a senior manager 0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
Share of women 0.031 (0.005)*** 0.027 (0.005)***
Share of white-collar workers 0.031 (0.005)*** 0.034 (0.005)***
Firm size 0.016 (0.004)*** 0.014 (0.004)***
Firm size2 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.001 (0.000)***
Institutional and labor market characteristics
Art. 18 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Unemployment rate by province 2006 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Metropolitan area 0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)*
Presence of an industrial district 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 2098 2098
Number of ﬁrms 920 1920
R2 0.15 0.14
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Clusterized robust standard errors (264 clusters) appear in
parentheses.
Estimation of equation (5).
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we consider (i.e., ﬁxed-term employment contracts or atypical contracts such
as external collaborations and agency contracts). The negative effect of ﬁxed-
term contracts is decreasing with the probability for a temporary worker of
obtaining a permanent position with the current employer and becomes posi-
tive when the conversion rate into a permanent position is above 35 percent.21
As our measure of effort concerns permanent workers only, this result sug-
gests that a high degree of job instability may be detrimental for the effort and
motivation of those who hold a permanent position. Theoretically, this may be
explained by arguing that when temporary employment is used as a buffer for
permanent employment, workers with a permanent position in the ﬁrm have a
higher incentive to shirk because the workforce adjustments in case of nega-
tive shocks will be primarily carried out through changes in temporary worker
ﬂows.22 Moreover, there is a large socioeconomic literature that relates work-
ers’ effort to the working environment characteristics and to coworkers’ beha-
vior. This strand of literature predicts that an increase in the degree of
uncertainty and precariousness inside the ﬁrm may lead to a deterioration in
the working environment, reduce workers’ cooperation, and undermine work-
ers’ motivations and effort.
To control for the effects of legislative protection on workers’ shirking
behavior, we use a dummy variable (art_18 in Table 4 and following tables),
which assumes value 1 for ﬁrms with a number of employees larger than 15
and zero otherwise. This dummy captures the effect of employment protection
legislation, as ﬁring costs are signiﬁcantly lower in ﬁrms with fewer than
sixteen employees in Italy. After controlling for ﬁrm size, the coefﬁcient of
the dummy variable for EPL strictness is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
On the other hand, absenteeism increases with the ﬁrm size at a decreasing
rate. The negative side effect on effort can be due both to differences in the
degree of workers’ protection due to differences in the legislation regulating
dismissals as well as to a higher degree of unionization of large ﬁrms (Origo
2009) and to difﬁculties of monitoring performance in large organizations.23
Finally, considering workforce characteristics, higher absenteeism is related to
21 The conversion rate is calculated as the share of ﬁxed-term contracts that became permanent during
the current and previous year over the total numbers of such contracts that existed during the same period.
In our sample, <30 percent of the ﬁrms which employ individuals on a temporary basis report a value above
the 35 percent threshold.
22 According to Goux, Maurin, and Pauchet (2001), when temporary employment is used as a buffer for
permanent employment, establishments foreseeing a decline in net employment in the long run opt to
increase their temporary job or worker ﬂows to accommodate their current demands while still keeping
future dismissal costs low.
23 A demand side explanation of the effect of size on absenteeism is put forward by Barmby and Ste-
phan (2000) who argue that larger ﬁrms are able to diversify risk from absence more easily than small ﬁrms
and this implies a lower propensity of contrasting absenteeism by the large ﬁrms.
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a large share of part-time workers, a large share of women (this result is in
line with Ichino and Moretti 2009), and a large share of blue-collar workers.
In the second speciﬁcation of the empirical model (equations 11–13), we
remove the assumption of perfect substitutability between white- and blue-
collar workers and estimate separately the effort equations for the two types of
workers. The results of the 3SLS regressions are reported in Tables 5–7.
The estimated coefﬁcients of the production function are in line with the
previously reported estimates. Interestingly, the coefﬁcients of the interaction
terms of the labor inputs (white-collar and blue-collar workers) with the share
of graduate workers are signiﬁcantly different from zero and with an opposite
sign. This suggests that the productivity gains from the highly educated work
force are stronger in ﬁrms with a larger number of workers involved in admin-
istrative/clerical jobs and decline with the number of workers involved in man-
ual tasks, implying complementarities between high level of education and
high-skill occupations. Considering the effort equation of the white-collar
workers (Table 6), a larger share of the variable wage premium (which is the
share of remuneration linked to ﬁrms’ performance) and other wage premia
(linked to individual performance) have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on
workers’ effort (through lower absenteeism). Moreover, as in the aggregate
case, the share of ﬁxed-term contracts is negatively signed, suggesting that job
TABLE 5
PRODUCTION FUNCTION WITH TWO TYPES OF WORKERS: 3SLS RESULTS
Dependent variable: value added
Pooled estimation
(1)
Pooled weighted
(2)
Labor inputWHITE (E = eL) 0.426 (0.047)
*** 0.446 (0.031)***
Labor inputBLUE (E = eL) 0.198 (0.038)
*** 0.249 (0.029)***
Physical capital stock 0.191 (0.026)*** 0.210 (0.020)***
Share temporary workers 0.151 (0.746) 0.069 (0.631)
Share graduate workers 1.068 (0.683)** 1.014 (0.561)**
Share temporary 9 Share white 0.381 (0.240) 0.244 (0.208)
Share temporary 9 Share blue 0.810 (1.355) 0.885 (1.130)
Share white 9 Share graduate 0.108 (0.127) 0.222 (0.120)**
Share blue 9 Share graduate 0.355 (0.185)** 0.491 (0.158)***
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 2098 2098
Number of ﬁrms 1920 1920
R2 0.58 0.70
p-value l = e 0.19 0.26
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Clusterized robust standard errors (264 clusters) appear in
parentheses. Labor input and capital stock had been instrumented with their lagged values.
Estimation of equation (11).
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instability is detrimental to workers’ effort when the conversion rate to perma-
nent employment is low. Finally, the coefﬁcient of the unemployment rate in
the local labor market is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, implying more
effort when the outside options are less favorable.
The effects of numerical ﬂexibility on blue-collar workers’ effort (Table 6)
are qualitatively similar, with some differences in the magnitude and signiﬁ-
cance of the estimated parameters. Differently from the white-collar workers’
TABLE 6
EFFORT EQUATION WITH TWO TYPES OF WORKERS: WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
Dependent variable: white-collar workers’ effort
Pooled estimation
(1)
Pooled weighted
(2)
Wage ﬂexibility
Share variable wage premium 0.078 (0.034)** 0.091 (0.041)**
Share other wage premium 0.042 (0.034) 0.086 (0.028)***
Super minimum differential 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Seniority differential 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Numerical ﬂexibility
Risk of dismissals 0.034 (0.019)* 0.056 (0.030)*
Hiring rate 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.004)
Share of temporary hiring 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Share of temporary workers 0.058 (0.027)** 0.074 (0.036)**
Share of temporary workers*trans. 0.130 (0.058)** 0.236 (0.075)***
Share of apprenticeship 0.004 (0.021) 0.014 (0.019)
Share of collaborators 0.007 (0.016) 0.003 (0.012)
Share of part-time workers 0.006 (0.015) 0.022 (0.015)
Share of agency workers 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Labor and ﬁrm characteristics
Presence of a senior manager 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Share of women 0.018 (0.006)*** 0.014 (0.006)**
Share of white-collar workers 0.007 (0.006) 0.009 (0.007)
Share of graduate workers 0.033 (0.013)*** 0.029 (0.016)**
Firm size 0.015 (0.005)*** 0.016 (0.005)***
Firm size2 0.001 (0.000)** 0.001 (0.000)**
Institutional and labor market characteristics
Art. 18 0.004 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Unemployment rate 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)**
Metropolitan area 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Presence of an industrial district 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Macroregional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 2098 2098
Number of ﬁrms 1920 1920
R2 0.07 0.08
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Clusterized robust standard errors (264 clusters) appear in
parentheses.
Estimation of equation (12).
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effort equation, blue-collar workers’ effort is not signiﬁcantly affected by mon-
etary incentives, all the controls for wage ﬂexibility being not signiﬁcant. This
different response to monetary incentive may be due to differences in the risk
attitude of blue-collar workers (Prendergast 1999; Sloof and van Praag 2008)
as well as differences in skill endowments (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).
Finally, to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant ﬁxed effects, Table 8
reports the regressions of the effort equations (aggregate, white collar, and
blue collar) in ﬁrst differences rather than in levels for a restricted sample
TABLE 7
EFFORT EQUATION WITH TWO TYPES OF WORKERS: BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
Dependent variable: blue-collar workers’ effort
Pooled estimation
(1)
Pooled weighted
(2)
Wage ﬂexibility
Share variable wage premium 0.021 (0.037) 0.001 (0.026)
Share other wage premium 0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.005)
Super minimum differential 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Seniority differential 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Numerical ﬂexibility
Risk of dismisals 0.001 (0.019) 0.016 (0.020)
Hiring rate 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004)
Share of temporary hiring 0.009 (0.004)** 0.007 (0.003)**
Share of temporary workers 0.046 (0.023)** 0.080 (0.030)***
Share of temp. workers*trans. 0.127 (0.052)** 0.204 (0.068)***
Share of apprenticeship 0.017 (0.021) 0.022 (0.026)
Share of collaborators 0.020 (0.011)* 0.021 (0.012)*
Share of part-time workers 0.007 (0.016) 0.030 (0.025)
Share of internal workers 0.000 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)**
Labor and ﬁrm characteristics
Presence of a senior manager 0.006 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.004)
Share of women 0.024 (0.006)*** 0.021 (0.007)***
Share of white-collar workers 0.038 (0.006)*** 0.042 (0.007)***
Share of graduate workers 0.008 (0.012) 0.008 (0.016)
Firm size 0.018 (0.004)*** 0.014 (0.006)***
Firm size2 0.001 (0.000)** 0.001 (0.000)*
Institutional and labor market characteristics
Art. 18 0.000 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005)
Unemployment rate 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Metropolitan area 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.003)
Presence of an industrial district 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Macroregional dummies Yes
Observations 2098 2098
Number of ﬁrms 1920 1920
R2 0.15 0.15
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Clusterized robust standard errors (264 clusters) appear in
parentheses.
Estimation of equation (13).
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of ﬁrms.24 We still ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of the
variable wage premium on white-collar workers’ effort and a negative effect
of temporary employment on both white-collar and blue-collar workers’
effort. This seems to conﬁrm the previous conclusions that wage ﬂexibility
can have a positive impact on effort and then on ﬁrm productivity, while
numerical ﬂexibility is detrimental for productivity through the negative
impact on effort.
Panel data two-step procedure and results. The pooled 3SLS regression
approach has two shortcomings. First, given the cross-section characteristic of
our database, we are not able to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant compo-
TABLE 8
EFFORT EQUATIONS ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: FIRST DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION
Effort
(1)
Effort white collar
(2)
Effort blue collar
(3)
Wage ﬂexibility
Share variable wage premium 0.057 (0.053) 0.190 (0.045)*** 0.012 (0.136)
Share other wage premium 0.017 (0.048) 0.070 (0.060) 0.004 (0.056)
Super minimum differential 0.001 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)* 0.001 (0.004)
Seniority differential 0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.007) 0.006 (0.004)
Numerical ﬂexibility
Risk of dismissals 0.030 (0.013)* 0.037 (0.013)*** 0.042 (0.012)***
Hiring rate 0.003 (0.007) 0.000 (0.007) 0.005 (0.007)
Share of temporary hiring 0.001 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006) 0.001 (0.008)
Share of temporary workers 0.155 (0.051)** 0.229 (0.083)** 0.111 (0.062)*
Share of temporary workers*trans. 0.356 (0.118)*** 0.439 (0.176)** 0.338 (0.147)**
Share of apprenticeship 0.033 (0.053) 0.103 (0.068) 0.018 (0.050)
Share of collaborators 0.002 (0.020) 0.005 (0.011) 0.010 (0.037)
Share of part-time workers 0.002 (0.032) 0.010 (0.018) 0.015 (0.081)
Share of internal workers 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Labor and ﬁrm characteristics
Presence of a senior manager 0.007 (0.009) 0.004 (0.011) 0.008 (0.009)
Share of women 0.043 (0.017)** 0.017 (0.012) 0.045 (0.021)**
Share of white-collar workers 0.035 (0.012)*** 0.019 (0.009)** 0.024 (0.013)*
Share of graduate workers 0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.015) 0.004 (0.020)
Firm size 0.023 (0.008)*** 0.015 (0.008)* 0.027 (0.010)***
Firm size2 0.002 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)*
Observations 356 356 356
Number of ﬁrms 178 178 178
R2 0.24 0.15 0.23
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
24 The number of observations for which data are available for both 2008 and 2009 is restricted to 178
ﬁrms. In Table 8, we report ﬁrst difference estimation of the effort equations for this sample of ﬁrms and
show that our main results are robust after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects.
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nents and this may bias the results. Moreover, as we already stressed, absen-
teeism may not be the only dimension through which ﬂexibility affects ﬁrm
performance. To address these two issues, we substitute (2) into (1) and we
estimate a reduced form equation relying upon a two-step procedure proposed
by Black and Lynch (2001) in a similar analysis.
In the ﬁrst step, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the AIDA data-
base and estimate a production function using data on value added, capital,
and workers which are available over the period 2000–2009.25 This allows us
to obtain robust estimates of the parameters on labor and capital. We then use
the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component of the residual in the sec-
ond step to identify the direct effect of quasi-time-invariant ﬁrm-level
regressors such as remuneration policy, human resources policies, and other
time-invariant characteristics on a broad indicator of ﬁrm productivity.
Solving equation (1) and (2), we obtain the following reduced form equation:
ln Yi;t ¼ a lnKi;t þ b ln Li;t þ chi þ #i;t; ð14Þ
where the error term can be decomposed into two parts
#i;t ¼ ti þ ei;t: ð15Þ
In equations (14) and (15) hi is a vector of ﬁrm characteristics, which
includes the vector Zi of the effort’s determinants as in equation (2), υi is
an observed time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc component, and ei,t is an error term.
In particular hi includes ﬁrms’ wage strategy (such as the share of perfor-
mance-related payments), human capital composition (skilled vs. unskilled
workers, and white- versus blue-collar workers), and ﬂexible work practices
(type of contracts), which may inﬂuence ﬁrm productivity through unobserv-
able effort.
Therefore, as in Black and Lynch (2001), we adopt the following two-step
procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we obtain a robust estimation of the parameters a
and b, compute the predicted values of equation (12) and then an estimate of
the chi+υi+ ei,t term. Averaging this latest term over time, we obtain an esti-
mate of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant component of the residual.26 In the
second step, we regress the average residual on the vector Zi, human capital
composition, industry and regional dummies. This two-step procedure allows
us to estimate the second step without the possible sources of biases arising
from capital and labor correlations with time-invariant effect υi.
25 After matching the longitudinal information from AIDA for the period 2000–2009 with the data from
the Conﬁndustria survey we end up with a ﬁnal estimation sample of 1820 ﬁrms.
26 That is deﬁned as technical efﬁciency in Schmidt and Sickles (1984).
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To run the ﬁrst-step coefﬁcients, we use the system generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator described by Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond
(2002), which overcomes the limitations of standard panel estimators (ﬁxed
effect and ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator), that is, unreliable low values of
the production factors parameters when the production factors (employment
and capital) are highly persistent.27
GMM system estimates in the ﬁrst step are reported in the ﬁrst panel of
Table 9. A cursory look of the table reveals that the regression is highly
signiﬁcant, standard speciﬁcation tests hold,28 and constant return to scale is
not accepted. As expected, the estimated coefﬁcient on the capital stock is
now larger than the one reported in Table 3, while that on the labor input is
smaller.29 Using these ﬁrst-step estimates, we calculate the average residual for
each ﬁrm in the sample.
The second panel of Table 9 shows the second-step results, obtained from
regressing the average residuals on the controls that were previously included
in the effort equations. Such regressions allow us to check whether monetary
incentives and numerical ﬂexibility have a direct and signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrm
productivity once we control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics in
the production function. The results appear qualitatively similar to those
obtained using the three-stage least-squares technique in Tables 6 and 7. As
expected, given the different deﬁnition of the left-hand side variable, which is
a much broader indicator of productivity than absenteeism, we see that the
estimated coefﬁcients appear larger in magnitude. In line with the 3SLS
27 Following Blundell and Bond (2000), equation (14) could have a dynamic common factor representa-
tion with the lagged value of Y in the right-hand side correlated with the ﬁxed-effect component of the error
term in (15). Two standard alternative strategies to avoid the endogeneity problem are the ﬁrst-differenced
GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998). In
the standard ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator lagged ﬁrst differences of all the variables are used as instru-
ments for the equations after eliminating the υi term through differentiation. However, the ﬁrst-differenced
GMM estimator has been found to have poor ﬁnite sample properties (bias and imprecision) when the
lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with subsequent ﬁrst differences (this is the case when
employment and capital are highly persistent). As highlighted in Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond
(2002), system GMM procedure outperforms the standard ﬁrst-differenced GMM by combining moment
conditions for the model in ﬁrst differences with moment conditions for the model in levels. Results using
the standard ﬁxed-effect estimator and the ﬁrst-differenced GMM estimator are qualitatively similar to those
obtained using the system GMM procedure and are available from the authors on request.
28 The common factor test shows that the nonlinear restrictions implied by the dynamic representation of
production function with an autoregressive error component is not rejected and the difference version of the
Sargan test accepts the validity of the instruments. Both of these tests are in line with the results of Blundell
and Bond (2000).
29 The coefﬁcients on capital and labor cannot be exactly compared with those in Table 1 also because
in this second set of regressions the sample is different (slightly smaller), and we are not controlling for the
quality of the labor input (human capital, effort, and the share of white-collar workers) when we estimate
the production function.
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regressions, the presence of a performance-related premium for white-collar
workers has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on productivity, while the same
premium paid to blue-collar workers has no impact on aggregate productivity.
As in the previous set of regressions, numerical ﬂexibility is positively
related to ﬁrm productivity only when conversion rates from temporary to per-
manent employment are high enough.30 This ﬁnding is consistent with the
TABLE 9
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: TWO-STEP SYSTEM GMM RESULTS
First step: value added 2000–2009
Labor input (E = eL) 0.491 (0.090)***
Physical capital stock 0.359 (0.058)***
Year dummies Yes
Number of ﬁrms 1820
Observations 11425
Wald v2 8032 (0.000)
Comfact (prob.) 0.21
Difference Sargan (prob.) 0.29
Second step: WLS on averaged residuals
Share variable wage premium white collar 0.473 (0.189)**
Share variable wage premium blue collar 0.046 (0.275)
Share other wage premium white collar 0.160 (0.180)
Share other wage premium blue collar 0.222 (0.239)
Super minimum differentials 0.011 (0.006)*
Seniority differential 0.009 (0.002)***
Share of women 0.111 (0.264)
Share of graduate workers 0.221 (0.056)***
Share of temporary workers 0.038 (0.103)
Share of temp. workers*trans. 0.856 (0.311)***
Share of apprenticeship 0.016 (0.113)
Share of collaborators 0.169 (0.132)
Risk of dismissions 0.001 (0.008)
Presence of senior manager 0.038 (0.014)***
Share of part-time workers 0.081 (0.099)
Unemployment rate 0.010 (0.004)**
Size 0.024 (0.017)
Size2 0.004 (0.002)**
Industry dummies Yes
Regional dummies Yes
Observations 1988
Number of ﬁrms 1820
R2 0.090
F-prob. 0.000
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. In the ﬁrst step we use two lags of capital and labor as instru-
ments. In the second step, clusterized robust standard errors (258 clusters) appear in parentheses.
Estimation of equation (14).
30 The threshold for conversion rate above which the effect of the share of temporary workers becomes
positive and signiﬁcant is around 20 percent.
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theoretical predictions that when ﬁxed-term contracts are used as a screening
device, they can be beneﬁcial in terms of productivity because they improve
the quality of the match between ﬁrms and workers and thus reduce turnover.
Structural equation modeling: An Alternative approach. In this section, we
present an alternative way to estimate the effects of wage and numerical ﬂexi-
bility on productivity. We treat effort as an unobservable (latent) variable, and
we use some observable variables that are potentially correlated with effort to
model it and its impact on productivity. To this aim, we use the simultaneous
equation modeling (SEM) technique.31
In line with the analysis developed in the previous section, we classify the
exogenous (latent) determinants of effort as: wage ﬂexibility ξ1, numerical
ﬂexibility ξ2, and workforce characteristics ξ3. In turn, we assume that these
latent exogenous variables inﬂuence some exogenous observables xj such as
the share of variable wage premium or the share of temporary workers. Such
observable variables are the effort determinants in the vector Zi as in equa-
tion (2). The relationships among latent and observed variables represent the
so-called measurement model, which is the following set of equations (in com-
pact and logarithmic form) as follows:32
xj ¼ /0j0nþ xj ð16Þ
y ¼ keþ
XK
k¼1
bkxk þ e ð17Þ
In equation (16) xj are the observable exogenous variables, which are deter-
mined by the exogenous (latent) factors ξ1,2,3 through φ.
33 In (17) y is value
added; xk are manifest exogenous, that is, human and physical capital inputs
which affect directly y; and e is the endogenous latent variable that may repre-
sent a global measure of technical efﬁciency as well as omitted variables bias,
with k being its impact coefﬁcient on productivity. Finally xj and e are the
error terms in equation (16) and (17), respectively.
The structural model links the exogenous latent determinants ξ1,2,3 to the
endogenous latent effort as follows:
e ¼ c1n1 þ c2n2 þ c3n3 þ m ð18Þ
31 For a description see Bollen (1989); Corbetta (2002) and Kline (2010).
32 Sufﬁx i which identify ﬁrms is omitted to simplify the notation.
33 The exogenous variables included in the vector xj are the same regressors included in the vector Z as
determinants of effort in equation (3). See page 6 for a full description of the variables.
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where c1,2,3 are the impact coefﬁcients of the structural model and m is the
error term. Figure 1 shows the theoretical links among the latent (endogenous
and exogenous) and the observed variables.
We then estimate the correlation matrices34 among variables and put a con-
straint for each equation containing a latent variable to identify the system.35
The model is estimated through maximum likelihood, while we use the conﬁr-
matory factor analysis to extract latent factors from the observed exogenous
variables. We estimate the coefﬁcients for the 2 years of the survey separately
because we cannot include categorical variables to identify relevant common
time-speciﬁc shocks that are relevant given the nature of our sample. Table 8
describes our results. In this case, we do not have separate tables for each
equation but aggregate results for the whole system (Table 10).36
The results indicate that the regressions ﬁt well the data and that the produc-
tion function has coefﬁcients very close to the 3SLS estimation. Beginning
X1 =(Risk of dismissals, Seniority differentials, Super minimum differentials, share of variable wage premium, share of other wage premium)
X2 =(Share of fixed term workers, share of part-time workers, share of apprenticeship, share of coll., share of atypical workers, share of
dismissed workers)
X3 =(Share of white collars, share of women)
FIGURE 1
SEM STRUCTURE
34 All the exogenous variables have the same scale because they are expressed in deviation from the
means, which means that we have a correlation matrix instead of a covariance matrix.
35 The model described by equations (16)-(18) has a structure that is similar to the 3SLS model we esti-
mated in the previous section, except for the fact that we have endogenous latent variables on the right-hand
side with coefﬁcients φ, k. If we have identity equations among y and e and x and ξ, then all the x variables
inﬂuence directly y as in a standard reduced form estimation.
36 We use the R package called sem, by Fox (2006).
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with the regressions with the 2008 data, the results show that the effort is
signiﬁcant and positively correlated with productivity. Moreover, the coefﬁcients
of the latent exogenous variables are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of
the previous sections. In particular, the results show that wage ﬂexibility has a
positive effect on effort and through effort on productivity, while numerical ﬂex-
ibility has an opposite impact. The results obtained using the 2009 data are qual-
itatively similar, although some coefﬁcients are less signiﬁcant.
Conclusions
This study has produced ecometric evidence on the relationships among
ﬂexible wage contracts, temporary jobs, and ﬁrm performance. The key results
TABLE 10
PRODUCTION FUNCTION: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING RESULTS
Dependent variable: value added
Year 2008
(1)
Year 2009
(2)
Production function
Stock of labor 0.697 (0.021)*** 0.437 (0.029)***
Physical capital stock 0.264 (0.021)*** 0.239 (0.029)***
Share graduate workers 0.070 (0.015)*** 0.069 (0.019)***
Effort 0.093 (0.027)*** 0.324 (0.606)
Effort determinants
Wage ﬂexibility 0.814 (0.372)** 0.219 (0.426)
Numerical ﬂexibility 0.467 (0.285)* 0.049 (0.132)
Labor and ﬁrm characteristics 1.000 (constraint) 1.000 (constraint)
Wage ﬂexibility (exogenous observed variables)
Seniority differentials 0.218 (0.069)** 0.006 (0.057)
Super minimum differentials 0.171 (0.068)** 0.005 (0.058)
Share of variable wage premium 0.205 (0.068)** 0.197 (0.047)***
Share of other variable premium 1.000 (constraint) 1.000 (constraint)
Numerical ﬂexibility (exogenous observed variables)
Share of ﬁxed-term workers 0.288 (0.060)*** 0.124 (0.047)***
Share of part-time workers 0.141 (0.071)** 0.017 (0.041)
Share of collaborators 0.044 (0.072) 0.205 (0.041)***
Share of atypical workers 0.076 (0.071) 0.053 (0.041)
Share ﬁred or dismissed workers 0.118 (0.070)* 0.016 (0.040)
Share of apprenticeship 1.000 (constraint) 1.000 (constraint)
Labor characteristics (exogenous observed variables)
Share of women 0.495 (0.057)*** 0.010 (0.061)
Share of white-collar workers 1.000 (constraint) 1.000 (constraint)
Observations 758 1631
Goodness of ﬁt index 0.75 0.78
p-value model v2 0.000 0.000
NOTE: ***, **, * Indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 percent. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Estimation of equations (16)–(18).
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indicate that wage ﬂexibility appears to have a positive and signiﬁcant effect
on effort and then (still positive) on ﬁrms’ productivity. This is conﬁrmed by
additional checks based on GMM-based panel estimation where wage ﬂexibil-
ity has a direct positive effect on productivity. Second, white-collar workers
are more responsive to monetary incentives than blue-collar workers. Finally,
we ﬁnd that a higher share of temporary contracts has a negative impact on
permanent workers’ effort when the conversion rate of jobs from temporary to
permanent is low. This may happen either because a larger share of ﬁxed-term
workers implies a lower dismissal probability for permanent workers, or
because an increase in the degree of precariousness inside the ﬁrms can lead
to a deterioration in the working environment and thus reduce workers’ moti-
vation and effort. This last effect has a (indirect) negative effect on ﬁrm
productivity.
Our ﬁndings suggest a bigger role for reforms aimed to increase wage
ﬂexibility in enhancing ﬁrms’ productivity, while those aimed to increase job
ﬂexibility through the introduction of temporary forms of employment are
detrimental for productivity when such contracts are perceived as dead ends.
Such policy implications contrast with the reforming process which inter-
ested Italy in the last decade. In fact, the main labor market reforms have been
mainly focused on providing ﬂexibility at the margin by deregulating the use
of atypical forms of employment. Only recently (July 2012), the Italian govern-
ment introduced small changes in the ﬁring procedures for open-ended
employees, by relaxing the institution of discriminatory ﬁring by extending
monetary refund to a larger number of cases.
In contrast, reforms aimed to decentralize the wage setting mechanisms
have been fewer, limited in scope, and slow in the implementation. However,
under the pressure of the global recession, the Italian government has
recently taken important steps in the direction of strengthening the respon-
siveness of wages to productivity. To this aim, a number of policy actions
have been under discussion with all the social parties to promote wage
bargaining decentralization and the introduction of tax incentives for
productivity-based contracts.
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